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‘How Many of Us Are There?’: 
Group Size Uncertainty and Social 
Value Orientations in Common 
Resource Dilemmas




In two studies, we investigate the effects of group size (un)certainty and social value orientations 
in common resource dilemmas. By focusing on this largely unexplored type of environmental 
uncertainty, we show that, in contrast to the often replicated fi nding that resource size 
uncertainty leads to over-harvesting in common resource dilemmas, group size uncertainty 
is not necessarily detrimental to the collective interest. Furthermore, we argue and show 
that whereas under group size certainty people base their individual harvests on the equal 
division rule, under group size uncertainty they base their harvests on their own social value 
orientations: whereas under group size certainty both proselfs and pro-socials harvest about an 
equal share of the common resource, under uncertainty prosocials show self-restraint in order 
to further their group’s outcomes.
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A well-known type of social dilemma is the 
common resource dilemma (or commons dilemma). 
In this type of social dilemma, a group of people 
have access to a limited common resource. 
A real-life example of such a resource dilemma 
Social dilemmas are situations in which people 
face a confl ict between their personal interests 
(called defection) and the interests of their group 
(called cooperation). In such dilemmas, people 
thus have to choose whether to defect or to 
cooperate. A choice to defect yields the best 
payoff to individual group members (i.e. in 
at least one of the possible outcome confi gur-
ations; Liebrand & Messick, 1996), whereas all 
individual group members are better off if all 
cooperate than if all defect (see Komorita & 
Parks, 1995; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002, 
for reviews).
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is the environmental problem of over-fi shing. In 
this resource dilemma, a group of fi shermen have 
access to a natural common resource, namely 
the fi sh population. When individual fi shermen 
choose to further their self-interest by catching 
as much fi sh as they can, the collective interest is 
jeopardized because excessive fi shing increases 
the chance of the resource becoming depleted. 
So whereas individual fi shermen may be tempted 
to overuse the common resource, the collective 
interest calls for moderate use. Moreover, to 
further complicate matters, fi shermen often do 
not know how large the fi sh population is or how 
many fi shermen are fi shing from the same pool 
(Ostrom, 1990; Takigawa & Messick, 1993).
Many real-life social dilemmas are thus char-
acterized by environmental uncertainty, or un-
certainty regarding the characteristics of the 
task environment of a social dilemma (Messick, 
Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). Earlier research 
has shown that environmental uncertainty can 
have a large impact on people’s choice behavior. 
For instance, earlier studies have repeatedly 
shown that uncertainty regarding the size of 
the resource (i.e. resource size uncertainty) leads 
to over-harvesting (e.g. Budescu, Rapoport, & 
Suleiman, 1990; De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, Wit, & 
De Cremer, 2006; Gustafsson, Biel, & Gärling, 
1999; Hine & Gifford, 1996; see Van Dijk, Wit, 
Wilke, & Budescu, 2004, for an overview of the 
effects of uncertainty). However, until now very 
little experimental research has been done to 
investigate other types of environmental un-
certainty, such as uncertainty about the number 
of group members sharing a resource (see Au & 
Ngai, 2003, for an exception).
In real life, group sizes are often uncertain. In 
many social dilemma situations, people do not 
know precisely how many group members there 
are. For instance, water consumers often do not 
know how many people are consuming water in 
their water district (see Ostrom, 1990; Takigawa 
& Messick, 1993, for numerous other real-life 
examples). Therefore, more experimental 
research is needed to obtain more insight 
into this type of environmental uncertainty 
(Van Dijk et al., 2004). In the present research, 
we will investigate how group size uncertainty 
infl uences choice behavior in common resource 
dilemmas.
Earlier research on group size 
uncertainty
To our knowledge, only one experimental study 
has been conducted to investigate group size 
uncertainty in social dilemmas. In an earlier 
paper in this journal, Au and Ngai (2003) inves-
tigated the effects of group size uncertainty in 
a single choice step-level common resource 
dilemma under different protocols of play. Each 
of their participants made only one harvesting 
decision in a series of successive rounds, either in 
a pre-specifi ed order (called a sequential protocol) 
or whenever (s)he decided to do so (called a self-
paced protocol). Overuse of the common resource 
would destroy its value and none of the harvests 
would be granted. In the group size certainty 
condition, participants were told that the group 
size was five. In the group size uncertainty 
condition, they were told that their group was 
equally likely to be any size between three and 
seven persons. In all conditions, after the fi rst 
round participants were fully informed about 
the combined harvests of all the preceding 
players in the sequence, but in the self-paced 
protocol participants were also informed about 
the number of players who had made requests 
in the previous round. 
The authors were primarily interested in effects 
on total requests, i.e. effects at the collective level. 
Their analyses showed that collective overuse was 
less likely to occur under group size uncertainty 
than under group size certainty. Under group 
size uncertainty, participants apparently acted 
as if the group size was large and requested less, 
to avoid collective overuse. Ancillary analyses 
showed that in the self-paced protocol of play, 
group size uncertainty resulted in participants 
delaying their harvest decision to a later round 
until they knew the combined harvests of all 
the preceding players in the sequence, reduc-
ing the risk of collective overuse. By contrast, 
participants who were certain that the group 
size was fi ve did not wait and were more likely 
to make a request in the fi rst round. Given 
389
de Kwaadsteniet et al. group size uncertainty in social dilemmas
that they—on average—requested somewhat 
more than their equal share (i.e. 1/5th of the 
common resource) the pool was more likely to 
be overused under group size certainty than 
under group size uncertainty. It may be sug-
gested that the self-paced protocol allowed 
participants to coordinate their actions. Under 
group size uncertainty, a participant could gain 
useful information about the number and the 
(combined) size of others’ requests by delaying 
his or her own harvest decision to a later round. 
This raises the question as to what will happen 
if uncertainty about the number and size of 
others’ requests cannot be reduced by strategic 
timing of one’s decisions. 
To investigate the effects of group size un-
certainty without the possibility of the strategic 
timing of decisions, the present studies use a 
simultaneous protocol of play, in which par-
ticipants will not be informed about the harvests 
of their fellow group members. By doing so, we 
can obtain more insight into the inhibiting effects 
of group size uncertainty on tacit coordination. 
Moreover, to answer the question as to how 
people make decisions when the possibility for 
tacit coordination is limited, we draw on Snyder 
and Ickes’ (1985) framework of strong versus 
weak situations. On the basis of this conceptual 
framework, we will argue and demonstrate that 
under group size uncertainty people base their 
harvesting decisions on their own social value 
orientations.
Tacit coordination and group size 
uncertainty as a weak situation
In social dilemmas such as the one described 
above, it is important for people to coordinate 
their choice behavior effi ciently (e.g. Van Dijk 
& De Cremer, 2006; Van Dijk & Wilke, 1996). 
In resource dilemmas, it is best for people to 
coordinate their decisions in such a way that the 
collective resource does not become depleted, 
which would be detrimental to individual as 
well as collective interests. However, effi cient co-
ordination is hampered when group members do 
not know what their fellow group members will 
decide. This uncertainty about the decisions of 
other group members is called social uncertainty 
(or strategic uncertainty; Messick et al., 1988). 
Earlier research has shown that people can often 
deal with such social uncertainty by means of 
tacit coordination (Schelling, 1980; Van Dijk & 
Wilke, 1996). That is, group members can pre-
dict their fellow group members’ decisions by 
using so-called tacit coordination rules (such 
as the equal division rule; see also Allison & 
Messick, 1990). Furthermore, people also use 
such coordination rules to determine their own 
choice behavior.
Imagine a resource dilemma with the same 
payoff structure as the one Au and Ngai used 
(2003). In this type of dilemma, a group of fi ve 
people own a collective resource of 500 coins. 
Each individual group member can request a 
number of coins from this resource. However, 
if the total group request exceeds the number 
of coins available in the collective resource, the 
resource becomes depleted and no one receives 
any coins. The fi ve group members cannot com-
municate with one another and do not know 
what their fellow group members will decide 
(i.e. social uncertainty). Research has shown that 
people tend to solve this social dilemma by using 
a tacit coordination rule, in this case the equal 
division rule. In other words, most group members 
will request an equal share from the collective 
resource (e.g. Allison & Messick, 1990), in this 
case 100 coins. If all group members decide 
to do so the resource is optimally used and all 
group members receive 100 coins. Thus, under 
certainty in a resource dilemma, people can 
tacitly coordinate their decisions by applying 
the equal division rule.
In order to apply the equal division rule, ho-
wever, people need specifi c and accurate infor-
mation about the task environment. To calculate 
an equal share people have to divide the size of 
the collective resource by the number of group 
members. In order to do so, they need to know 
exactly how large the resource is and how many 
people the group consists of. Thus, when the 
group size is uncertain it becomes much more 
diffi cult for group members to apply the equal 
division rule. What do people base their decisions 
on under such group size uncertainty?
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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The answer to this question may be found 
in Snyder and Ickes’ framework of weak versus 
strong situations (1985; see also Roch & 
Samuelson, 1997; Van Lange, 1997). Snyder and 
Ickes distinguish two types of situations. Strong 
situations are situations that provide salient cues 
for people to base their decisions on. In strong 
situations, people base their decisions on these 
salient environmental cues. As a result, strong 
situations lead to little interpersonal variation 
in their decisions. Weak situations, by con-
trast, do not provide people with such salient 
environmental cues. In weak situations, people 
cannot use external cues to base their decisions 
on, but they base their decisions on their own 
dispositional preferences.
When we apply this framework to group size 
(un)certainty in social dilemmas, we can char-
acterize social dilemmas with group size certainty 
as strong situations. After all, under group 
size certainty most people may decide to base 
their choice behavior on the equal division 
rule. By contrast, social dilemmas with group 
size uncertainty can be characterized as weak 
situations that do not provide people with the 
salient cues to apply the equal division rule. 
Under group size uncertainty we can there-
fore expect people to base their decisions on 
their own dispositional preference for either 
cooperation or non-cooperation, i.e. their social 
value orientation.
Social value orientation (SVO) is a personality 
variable that indicates how people evaluate 
outcomes for themselves and others (Messick & 
McClintock, 1968; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). 
Generally, a distinction is made between three 
types of SVOs (e.g. Van Lange, 1999): (a) co-
operation, i.e. the preference to maximize joint 
outcomes and establish an equal distribution, 
(b) individualism, i.e. the preference to maxi-
mize own outcomes, and (c) competition, i.e. the 
preference to maximize the relative advantage 
of own outcomes. Cooperators are commonly 
referred to as prosocials, and individualists and 
competitors as proselfs. In social dilemmas, 
prosocials generally show more cooperative be-
havior than proselfs (e.g. Kramer, McClintock, & 
Messick, 1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985).
Study 1
Based on the above, we predict an interaction 
between group size uncertainty and SVO on 
individual requests. Under group size certainty 
(i.e. a strong situation), we expect that proselfs 
as well as prosocials will base their harvest-
ing decisions on the equal division rule and 
therefore we predict a limited difference between 
proselfs’ and prosocials’ individual requests 
(Hypothesis 1). Under group size uncertainty 
(i.e. a weak situation), by contrast, we expect that 
participants will base their decisions on their own 
SVO, and therefore we predict a (signifi cant) 
difference between the individual requests 
of proselfs versus prosocials, i.e. prosocials’ 
requests being lower than those of proselfs 
(Hypothesis 2).
Method
Participants and design Participants were 120 
students at Leiden University (15 men and 105 
women, mean age = 20.80 years) who volunteered 
for the study. At the beginning of the experiment 
each participant’s SVO was assessed. Group size 
uncertainty was manipulated as a within-subjects 
factor. Accordingly, a 2 (SVO: Proselfs vs. 
Prosocials) × 2 (Group Size Uncertainty: No vs. 
Yes) factorial design with repeated measures on 
the latter factor was used. 
Procedure The participants were invited to 
participate in a study on ‘group decision making’. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory they were seated 
in separate cubicles, each containing a personal 
computer. This computer was used to give 
instructions to the participants and to register 
the dependent measures.
Assessment of SVO At the beginning of the 
experimental session, participants completed 
the nine-item version of the decomposed games 
measure to assess their SVOs (Van Lange, De 
Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). The de-
composed games measure has excellent psycho-
metric qualities. It is internally consistent (e.g. 
Parks, 1994), reliable over substantial time 
periods (Eisenberger, Kuhlman, & Cotterell, 
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1992), and not related to measures of social 
desirability (e.g. Platow, 1994). The task consists 
of nine items, each containing three alternative 
outcome distributions with points for oneself 
and an anonymous other. For each of these 
nine items the participants had to choose 
which of the three distributions they preferred. 
Each item contained a prosocial (e.g. self: 500, 
other: 500), an individualistic (e.g. self: 560, 
other: 300), and a competitive option (e.g. self: 
490, other: 90). 
Participants were classifi ed as prosocial, indi-
vidualistic, or competitive when at least six out 
of nine choices were consistent with one of 
these three orientations (e.g. Van Lange & 
Kuhlman, 1994). Out of 120 participants, 54 
(45%) were classifi ed as prosocials, 40 (33%) 
as individualists, and 12 (10%) as competitors. 
Fourteen participants (12%) could not be clas-
sifi ed and were therefore excluded from further 
analyses. As in many earlier studies (e.g. Kramer 
et al., 1986; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van 
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), individualists and 
competitors were combined to form one group 
of proselfs (n = 52; 43%). After completing the 
SVO measure, participants responded to some 
fi ller questionnaires. Next, they were presented 
with the resource dilemma.
The resource dilemma Participants were 
informed that they would be part of a group of 
people, that each group member was sitting in 
a separate cubicle and that there was no com-
munication possible among participants. 
Furthermore, participants were not aware of the 
identity of their fellow group members. Decisions 
had to be made privately and anonymously.
The participants were presented with two 
similar resource dilemmas that only differed in 
the degree of group size uncertainty. Participants 
learned that at the end of the experimental 
session a computer would randomly select one 
of these two situations and that this selected 
situation would be used to calculate the amount 
of money each individual group member would 
earn. Since only the selected situation was used 
to calculate the participants’ earnings, each of 
these two situations can be considered an inde-
pendent single-trial resource dilemma. 
In each of these resource dilemmas, each 
group member could request any number of 
coins from a collective resource of 500 coins. 
Each coin was worth 0.01 euro (1 euro was 
approximately US$1.35). For each of these 
resource dilemmas it held that if the group’s 
collective request would be smaller than or 
equal to the resource size, the requests were 
granted and each group member would earn 
the amount of money he or she had requested 
in that situation. However, if the group’s col-
lective request exceeded the resource size all 
group members would earn zero outcomes. 
This resource dilemma is similar to the one 
used by Au and Ngai (2003) but in the present 
study participants had to make their decisions 
simultaneously. Moreover, during and between 
the two resource dilemmas no feedback was given 
about the decisions of the other group members 
nor about the group’s collective request.
Manipulation of group size uncertainty The 
two situations only differed in the degree of un-
certainty about the size of the group. Group size 
uncertainty was manipulated by varying the range 
of the uniform distribution of the group size. 
The midpoint of these ranges was kept constant 
across the two conditions, namely fi ve. Under No 
Uncertainty, the group size was certain, namely 
fi ve group members (midpoint = 5, range = 0). 
Under Uncertainty, the group would consist of 
at least two and at most eight group members 
(midpoint = 5, range = 6). Participants learned 
that the exact size of the group in the uncertainty 
condition would be randomly drawn from 
these uniform distributions by a computer at the 
end of the experimental session (i.e. participants 
were told that their group was equally likely to 
be any size between two and eight persons). 
The two conditions were counterbalanced to 
check for order effects. Preliminary analyses 
revealed no signifi cant order effects on any of 
the dependent variables (all F s < 1).
After the participants had read the instructions 
of the resource dilemmas, three practice ques-
tions were posed to ensure comprehension of 
these dilemmas. For example, participants were 
asked how much each group member would earn 
if the total group request exceeded the size of 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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the collective resource; 99% of all participants 
answered all three questions correctly. After 
each question the correct answer was disclosed 
and the most important characteristics of the 
dilemmas were repeated. After that, the two 
dilemmas were presented.
Dependent measures In each of the two 
(un)certainty conditions, participants requested 
a number of coins from the common resource. 
Additionally, under group size uncertainty they 
were asked to estimate the size of the group. 
At the end of the experimental session, which 
lasted about half an hour, all participants were 
debriefed, thanked, and paid for their par-
ticipation. In the debriefi ng, we explained that 
we would pay all participants the same amount 
of money for their participation, namely 6 euros 
(i.e. approximately US$8), plus the extra money 
they had earned in one of the two resource 
dilemmas. All participants agreed with this pay-
ment procedure.
Results
Manipulation check All analyses were per-
formed with 2 (SVO) × 2 (Group Size Uncertainty) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated 
measures on the latter factor.
In each of the two conditions, we asked par-
ticipants to indicate how uncertain they were 
about the size of the group (1 = very certain; 
7 = very uncertain). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on this meas-
ure only yielded a highly signifi cant main effect 
of Group Size Uncertainty (F(1, 104) = 2417.61, 
p < .0001, η2 = .96). As expected, participants 
were more uncertain about their estimates 
under Group Size Uncertainty (M = 6.25) than 
under No Group Size Uncertainty (M = 1.10). 
These results show that we were successful in 
manipulating group size uncertainty.
Individual requests In each of the two con-
ditions, the participants individually requested 
a number of coins from the common resource 
(see Table 1). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on participants’ 
individual requests yielded a signifi cant main 
effect of SVO (F(1, 104) = 5.07, p < .05, η2 = .05), 
which was qualified by a significant SVO × 
Group Size Uncertainty interaction effect 
(F(1, 104) = 6.18, p < .05, η2 = .06). It should 
be noted, however, that in accordance with 
our expectations, the variance in the Group 
Size Uncertainty condition was considerably 
larger than the variance in the No Group Size 
Uncertainty condition. In order to reduce this 
heterogeneity of variances, we applied a square 
root transformation on participants’ indivi-
dual requests in all conditions. After applying 
this transformation, which successfully reduced 
the heterogeneity of variances, a 2 × 2 ANOVA 
still yielded a signifi cant main effect of SVO 
(F(1, 104) = 4.93, p < .05, η2 = .05), and a signifi -
cant SVO × Group Size Uncertainty interaction 
effect (F(1, 104) = 7.01, p < .01, η2 = .06), as 
well as a signifi cant main effect of Group Size 
Uncertainty (F(1, 104) = 8.32, p < .01, η2 = .07), 
which was also qualifi ed by the interaction.
To interpret the interaction effect, we tested 
whether the individual requests of proselfs dif-
fered from those of prosocials in each of the 
two Group Size (Un)certainty conditions. In 
accordance with Hypothesis 1, independent 
t tests on the individual requests showed no 
significant difference between proselfs and 
prosocials under No Uncertainty (M = 95.15 
vs. 95.26, respectively) (t(104) = 0.02, p = .98). 
Under Uncertainty, however, prosocials requested 
signifi cantly lower amounts of coins than proselfs 
(M = 100.25 vs. 73.17, respectively) (t(104) = 
2.55, p < .01). This latter fi nding corroborates 
Hypothesis 2.
Table 1. Study 1: Individual requests by social value orientation and group size uncertainty
  Group size uncertainty
 
Social value orientation No Yes
Proselfs (n = 52) 95.15(16.92) 100.25(70.36)
Prosocials (n = 54) 95.26(26.44) 73.17(33.23)
Notes: Higher scores denote higher individual requests. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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Further, we also looked at the effect of group 
size uncertainty for proselfs and prosocials 
separately. To do so, we conducted two separ-
ate repeated measures ANOVAs (i.e. one for 
each SVO) with Group Size Uncertainty as 
the independent variable (i.e. No vs. Yes) and 
individual requests as the dependent variable. 
These analyses showed that the requests of pro-
selfs did not differ signifi cantly between the two 
(un)certainty conditions (F(1, 51) = .27, p = .61, 
η2 = .01), whereas prosocials requested signifi -
cantly lower amounts of coins in the Uncertainty 
condition than in the No Uncertainty condition 
(F(1, 53) = 18.44, p < .001, η2 = .26).1 
Adherence to equality To assess to what degree 
participants anchored their decisions on the 
equal division rule, we investigated to what extent 
their individual requests deviated from an equal 
share. In the Uncertainty condition we calculated 
this equal share by dividing the resource size 
(i.e. 500 coins) by the participants’ own group 
size estimates. After that, we calculated the 
absolute difference between participants’ indi-
vidual requests and this equal share (for a similar 
procedure to assess adherence to coordination 
rules, see e.g. Van Dijk & Wilke, 2000). A 2 × 2 
ANOVA on the deviation scores only yielded a 
signifi cant main effect of Group Size Uncertainty 
(F(1, 103) = 8.12, p < .01, η2 = .07): participants’ 
requests deviated signifi cantly more from an 
equal share under Group Size Uncertainty 
(M = 18.05) than under No Group Size Un-
certainty (M = 7.98). This fi nding further cor-
roborates our reasoning that under group size 
uncertainty people anchor their decisions less 
strongly on the equal division rule than under 
group size certainty.
Discussion
The data of Study 1 corroborate our hypotheses 
by showing the predicted interaction between 
SVO and group size uncertainty. Whereas both 
prosocials and proselfs harvested about an 
equal share under certainty, under uncertainty 
prosocials harvested less for themselves 
than proselfs. Furthermore, our data showed 
that prosocials decreased their harvests under 
group size uncertainty, whereas for proselfs the 
mean harvests remained the same.
But why did prosocials display self-restraint 
under group size uncertainty? To answer this 
question, it may be useful to take a closer look 
at the motives that may drive prosocials’ deci-
sions. Prosocials can be characterized by two 
main motives: they strive toward (a) equality in 
outcomes and (b) maximized joint outcomes 
(see e.g. Van Lange, 1999). Therefore, it can be 
expected that these motives are important for 
them. However, the fact that these two motives 
are important for prosocials does not mean 
that these motives always explain their choice 
behavior. After all, although prosocials may be 
motivated to further both of these goals, they may 
not always be able to achieve them. For example, 
as we already argued in our introduction, equal-
ity is very diffi cult to apply under group size 
uncertainty (cf. De Kwaadsteniet, Van Dijk, 
Wit, De Cremer, & De Rooij, 2007). Thus, even 
if prosocials are highly motivated to achieve 
equality, they may not be able to do so under 
group size uncertainty, not even by displaying 
self-restraint. Furthermore, the second motive 
that characterizes prosocials, namely maximizing 
joint outcomes, does not necessarily imply self-
restraint either. Thus, whether either one of these 
motives drives prosocials’ self-restraint under 
group size uncertainty remains an empirical 
question. Therefore, we decided to investigate 
this issue in a second study, in which we explicitly 
measure these two motives.
Study 2: The underlying motives of 
self-restraint
First, we predict the same interaction as in 
Study 1, that under group size certainty both 
prosocials and proselfs will harvest about an equal 
share from the common resource (see Hypoth-
esis 1), whereas under group size uncertainty 
prosocials will show more self-restraint than 
proselfs (see Hypothesis 2). Second, we will 
test whether prosocials’ self-restraint may be 
explained by either one of the two motives 
we described above, namely (a) the ‘Equality’ 
motive and (b) the ‘MaxJoint’ motive. And 
fi nally, we expect to replicate the fi nding of 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(3)
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Study 1 that under group size uncertainty people 
deviate more from equality than under group 
size certainty (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Participants and design Participants were 78 
students at Leiden University (42 men and 36 
women, mean age = 20.95 years) who volun-
teered for the study. The design of Study 2 was 
identical to that of Study 1. Again, fi rst each 
participant’s SVO was assessed (29 proselfs and 
42 prosocials) and after that group size un-
certainty was manipulated as a within-subjects 
factor. Accordingly, a 2 (SVO: Proselfs vs. Pro-
socials) × 2 (Group Size Uncertainty: No vs. Yes) 
factorial design with repeated measures on the 
latter factor was used.
Procedure The procedure of Study 2 was 
similar to that of Study 1. However, in this second 
study, after participants had made their indi-
vidual requests, they were asked a number of 
questions to measure the motives underlying 
their harvesting decisions. Again, the two 
(un)certainty conditions were counterbalanced 
to check for order effects. Preliminary analyses 
revealed no signifi cant order effects on any 
of the dependent variables (all Fs < 1). Before 
participants were presented with the social 
dilemmas, we again posed the same three prac-
tice questions as in Study 1. This time, 97% of 
all participants answered all three practice ques-
tions correctly. At the end of the experimental 
session, participants were paid 6 euros (i.e. 
approximately US$ 8). They all agreed with this 
payment procedure.
Dependent measures As in Study 1, in both 
(un)certainty conditions participants requested 
a number of coins from the common resource. 
After that, in each (un)certainty condition, two 
questions were posed about the motives that 
might have driven their decisions: (a) participants 
were asked to what extent they wanted their 
group to earn as much as possible (the ‘MaxJoint’ 
motive), and (b) they were asked to what 
extent they wanted the common resource to be 
distributed equally among the group members 
(the ‘Equality’ motive).2 Both questions were 
answered on 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at 
all; 7 = very much so).
Results
Manipulation check In each of the two (un)-
certainty conditions, we asked participants to 
indicate how uncertain they were about the 
size of the group (1 = very certain; 7 = very un-
certain). A 2 × 2 ANOVA on this measure only 
yielded a highly signifi cant main effect of Group 
Size Uncertainty (F(1, 69) = 595.76, p < .0001, 
η2 = .90). As expected, participants were more 
uncertain about their estimates under Group Size 
Uncertainty (M = 6.32) than under No Group 
Size Uncertainty (M = 1.44). These results show 
that we were successful in manipulating group 
size uncertainty.
Individual requests As in Study 1, a 2 × 2 ANOVA 
on participants’ individual requests yielded a 
signifi cant SVO × Group Size Uncertainty inter-
action effect (F(1, 69) = 5.13, p < .05, η2 = .07), 
indicating that whereas prosocials’ and proselfs’ 
requests did not differ signifi cantly under No 
Uncertainty (M = 97.50 vs. 105.17, respectively) 
(t(69) = 1.21, p = .23), prosocials requested 
signifi cantly less than proselfs under Uncertainty 
(M = 84.95 vs. 122.69, respectively) (t(69) = 2.87, 
p < .01).3,4 In other words, as we expected, under 
group size uncertainty prosocials showed more 
self-restraint than proselfs.
MaxJoint and equality Two separate 2 × 2 
ANOVAs on (a) the ‘MaxJoint’ motive and (b) the 
‘Equality’ motive both yielded signifi cant main 
effects of Group Size Uncertainty (both Fs > 4.40, 
both ps < .05), and significant main effects 
of SVO (both Fs > 7.50, both ps < .01). These 
analyses indicated that under No Uncertainty 
participants were more motivated to achieve 
these two goals than under Uncertainty, and that 
prosocials were more motivated to achieve these 
goals than proselfs. This latter fi nding is in line 
with the defi nition of prosocials as fi nding both 
motives important. See Table 2 for the means 
involved in these analyses.
Which motive underlies self-restraint? The 
main goal of Study 2 was to investigate which 
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motive may have driven prosocials’ self-restraint 
under group size uncertainty. To investigate this, 
we tested whether the effect of SVO on indi-
vidual requests under group size uncertainty 
(i.e. that prosocials show more self-restraint 
than proselfs) was mediated by the two motives 
we mentioned above. This mediation analysis 
(see Baron & Kenny, 1986) showed that the 
effect of SVO on individual requests was fully 
mediated by the ‘MaxJoint’ motive (Sobel test 
value = –2.32, p < .05), but not by the ‘Equality’ 
motive. Although we would like to note that 
caution is warranted in interpreting such medi-
ation analyses, these fi ndings seem to imply 
that prosocials’ self-restraint under group size 
uncertainty may be explained by their motivation 
to maximize their group’s outcomes.
Adherence to equality As in Study 1, we also 
investigated to what degree participants anchored 
their decisions on the equal division rule in 
the two Group Size (Un)certainty conditions. 
Again, using their own group size estimates, 
we calculated to what extent their individual 
requests deviated from an equal share. As 
predicted, a 2 × 2 ANOVA on the (absolute) de-
viation scores yielded a signifi cant main effect 
of Group Size Uncertainty (F(1, 68) = 3.11, 
p < .05, η2 = .04, one-sided). This main effect 
indicated that participants’ requests deviated 
signifi cantly more from an equal share under 
Group Size Uncertainty (M = 16.86) than under 
No Group Size Uncertainty (M = 10.64). This 
fi nding corroborates Hypothesis 3, that under 
group size uncertainty people anchor their 
decisions less strongly on the equal division 
rule than under certainty.
Discussion
The data of Study 2 again showed the predicted 
interaction between SVO and group size un-
certainty. Whereas both prosocials and proselfs 
harvested about an equal share under group 
size certainty, under group size uncertainty pro-
socials showed more self-restraint than proselfs. 
Furthermore, although our data showed that 
the Equality and MaxJoint motives are both 
important motives for prosocials (see Table 2), 
our mediation analyses suggested that the self-
restraint of prosocials (that was observed under 
group size uncertainty) can be understood by 
their motivation to maximize joint outcomes. 
Finally, we again showed that under group size 
uncertainty people deviate more from equality 
than under group size certainty.
General discussion
In the present article, we reported two experi-
mental studies that investigated the infl uence 
of group size uncertainty and SVO in social 
dilemmas. Both studies corroborate our idea 
that group size uncertainty has important conse-
quences for how people tacitly coordinate their 
behavior. Under group size certainty, people 
can effi ciently coordinate their behavior by 
applying the equal division rule. By contrast, 
under group size uncertainty tacit coordination 
is hampered because the task environment does 
not provide people with the salient cue to apply 
the equal division rule. In that case, people rely 
on internal cues (i.e. their SVO) to determine 
their harvesting decisions. Additionally, we 
demonstrated that, in contrast to earlier fi nd-
ings on resource size uncertainty (e.g. Budescu 
Table 2. Study 2: The ‘MaxJoint’ and ‘Equality’ motives by social value orientation and group size uncertainty




Social value orientation MaxJoint Equality MaxJoint Equality
Proselfs (n = 52) 4.55 4.93 3.79 4.55
 (1.76) (2.05) (1.74) (2.06)
Prosocials (n = 54) 5.43 6.00 5.17 5.40
 (1.64) (1.34) (1.62) (1.59)
Notes: Higher scores denote stronger motives. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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et al., 1990; Gustafsson et al., 1999), group size 
uncertainty does not necessarily induce over-
harvesting.
Thus, on the one hand our results show that 
group size uncertainty hampers effi cient co-
ordination. At the same time, however, our 
results corroborate and extend Au and Ngai’s 
(2003) fi ndings by showing that group size 
uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental to 
collective interests, even when people make their 
harvesting decisions simultaneously (and they 
cannot know their fellow group members’ deci-
sions). Interestingly, whereas earlier research 
has shown that uncertainty about the size of 
the common resource leads to non-cooperative 
behavior, the present fi ndings indicate that 
uncertainty about the size of the group may even 
induce some people (i.e. prosocials) to show 
self-restraint. However, this fi nding raised the 
question as to why exactly group size uncertainty 
induced prosocials to show self-restraint. Was 
their self-restraint motivated by equality or by 
the motive to maximize joint outcomes? The 
fi ndings of Study 2 showed that, although both 
motives are important for prosocials, their self-
restraint may be explained by their motivation to 
maximize joint outcomes. These results indicate 
that the motive to maximize joint outcomes may 
have driven the self-restraint that we observed 
under group size uncertainty and perhaps also 
the self-restraint that Au and Ngai observed in 
their study.
Our data thus suggest that prosocials may 
have reasoned that under group size uncertainty 
self-restraint is benefi cial to the collective. But 
is self-restraint really a good means to maxi-
mize the group’s outcomes? A plausible answer 
to this question can be found in Au and Ngai’s 
paper (2003). In an appendix to their paper, 
they presented a calculative analysis that showed 
that in order to maximize group earnings, 
individual requests should decrease as the size 
of the group becomes more uncertain. More 
specifi cally, the expected utility for the group and 
its members is largest when all group members 
determine their harvesting decisions based on 
the largest possible group size. In other words, if 
group members want to maximize their group’s 
payoffs, it is best to coordinate their individual 
harvests by dividing the common resource by 
the largest group size possible (i.e. in our single-
trail resource dilemma they should each harvest 
500/8 = about 60 coins). Thus, under group 
size uncertainty self-restraint indeed seems to 
be benefi cial to the collective interest.
As we already noted in the introduction to 
this article, the present research was strongly 
based on Au and Ngai’s (2003) paper on 
group size uncertainty. Our fi rst goal was to see 
whether their fi ndings would generalize to a re-
source dilemma with a simultaneous protocol. 
Therefore, we decided to use a social dilemma 
paradigm that closely resembled the one that 
was used by Au and Ngai. In this paradigm, par-
ticipants have only one chance to harvest any 
amount of coins from the common resource. 
However, if the collective harvest exceeds the 
amount available in the common resource, 
no one receives anything (see also e.g. Budescu 
et al., 1990; De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; 
Gustafsson et al., 1999, for similar paradigms). 
Although this single-trial resource dilemma is 
often referred to as a social dilemma game, it 
also has some characteristics of a coordination 
game (see De Vries & Wilke, 1992). Therefore, 
the question remains as to whether the present 
results would generalize to other social dilemma 
paradigms. For instance, would people still 
show so much self-restraint if the consequences 
of over-harvesting were in the future, such as 
in a multiple-trial social dilemma with group 
size uncertainty? And does a multiple-trial 
dilemma—in which there is no clear absolute 
maximum total request—constitute a weaker 
situation than the single-trial dilemma we 
used in the present research? To investigate 
the generalizability of the present results, it is 
important to address these and other questions 
in future research.
It is also worthwhile to acknowledge the 
fact that the data of both studies provide fi rm 
support for the suggestion that Snyder and 
Ickes’ (1985) weak–strong distinction is highly 
applicable to social dilemma situations (see also 
De Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006; Roch & Samuelson, 
1997; Van Lange, 1997). In the present research, 
we showed that when the task environment of a 
social dilemma provides a salient cue to guide 
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behavior, people will base their decisions on that 
cue (e.g. the equal division rule under group 
size certainty), whereas they will base their deci-
sions on their own disposition when the task 
environment does not provide such a cue (e.g. 
their SVO under group size uncertainty). These 
fi ndings thus clearly show that Snyder and Ickes’ 
framework (1985) on strong versus weak situ-
ations can be fruitfully used to explain and 
predict choice behavior in social dilemmas, and 
we therefore believe that future research may 
greatly benefi t from applying this framework 
to social dilemmas.
To summarize, the present studies have gen-
erated a number of interesting fi ndings. First, 
we showed that group size uncertainty—as op-
posed to resource size uncertainty—does not 
induce general over-harvesting and that this 
type of uncertainty is not necessarily detrimental 
to collective interests. After all, group size 
uncertainty induces prosocials to show self-
restraint under uncertainty. Second, we showed 
that group size uncertainty hampers effi cient 
coordination, inducing people to base their 
decisions on internal cues (i.e. their SVO) instead 
of external ones (i.e. the equal division rule), 
which corroborates the suggestion that Snyder 
and Ickes’ (1985) weak–strong distinction can 
fruitfully be applied to social dilemmas. And 
third, we showed that prosocials’ self-restraint 
under group size uncertainty may be explained by 
their motive to maximize their group’s outcomes. 
Taken together, by investigating the topic of 
group size (un)certainty in social dilemmas and 
relating this topic to tacit coordination and SVO, 
the present studies have generated a number of 
new insights into this largely unexplored type 
of environmental uncertainty.
Notes
1. These analyses were also done on proself 
and prosocials’ transformed requests 
(i.e. transformed by applying square root 
transformations), which yielded the same results.
2. It may be interesting to note that we also 
measured to what extent participants were 
motivated to maximize their own outcomes 
(i.e. the ‘MaxOwn’ motive). As expected, we 
found that proselfs were more motivated by this 
motive than prosocials and that this motive was 
positively correlated with participants’ harvests. 
However, a mediation analysis showed that this 
motive did not mediate the effect of SVO on 
harvests under group size uncertainty.
3. As in Study 1, we also conducted these analyses 
after applying a square root transformation. 
These analyses yielded similar results.
4. It should be noted that in contrast to Study 1, 
in Study 2 we did not fi nd a main effect of 
Group Size Uncertainty on individual requests 
(F(1, 69) = 0.14, p = 71, η2 = .002). The mean 
requests seemed to be almost identical in the 
two (un)certainty conditions (M No Uncertainty = 
100.63 vs. M Uncertainty = 100.37). This difference 
between the results of the two studies can be 
explained by the fact that whereas in Study 1 the 
requests of proselfs appeared to be unaffected 
by group size uncertainty, in Study 2 their mean 
requests increased slightly under uncertainty 
(from 105.17 coins to 122.69 coins). However, 
as in Study 1, prosocials still decreased their 
mean requests under group size uncertainty 
(from 97.50 coins to 84.95 coins) and they again 
showed self-restraint under such uncertainty.
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